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The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 4, Number 3.2
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A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online
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CDT POLICY POST Volume 4, Number 3.2 February 18, 1998
CONTENTS: (1) Civil liberties groups criticize FBI wiretap plans,
call on Federal Communications Commission to protect
security and privacy.
(2) FBI claims 'substantial progress'; facts show otherwise
(3) CALEA's public accountability mechanisms have stymied
FBI overreaching
(4) How to Subscribe/Unsubscribe
(5) About CDT, Contacting us
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(1) Civil liberties groups criticize FBI wiretap plans, call on Federal
Communications Commission to protect security and privacy.
CDT and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility filed comments on
February 11 urging the FCC to block the FBI's efforts to expand the scope
of the digital telephony law ('CALEA'). The groups warned that the FBI is
trying to negotiate with telephone companies outside the public view to
acquire more intrusive monitoring capabilities.
Their comments are here.
The groups urged the FCC to shift the focus of its inquiry to the security
and privacy issues posed by wiretapping in a world of computerized,
networked telephone switches. They warned that switch-based solutions
adopted under CALEA may increase the vulnerability of the telephone system.
CDT and CPSR also urged the FCC to launch an inquiry into the privacy
implications of surveillance in packet switched networks. Packet
switching is the basis of many Internet communications, but is now
increasingly used for voice communications, where it may result in the
government capturing communications it has no authority to intercept.
CDT has posted a copy of the comments the FBI filed at the FCC. They provide a
picture of the FBI's view of what CALEA means.
(2) FBI claims 'substantial progress'; facts show otherwise
On January 26, 1998, the FBI transmitted to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees a report on the status of CALEA. CDT has posted
a copy of the FBI report.
The report was requested last year by the Appropriations Committees, yet it
failed to answer some of the Committees key questions. The Committees
asked for cost estimates. No switch manufacturer and no carrier was willing
to state for the public record cost estimates for complying with CALEA.
The Committees asked the FBI to submit two signed 'cooperative agreements'
with carriers or manufacturers. As of January 26, the FBI was still
negotiating, and had no finalized cooperative agreements.
The Committees asked for timelines for compliance. The report states that
one major manufacturer, Lucent, will not have a CALEA solution available
until the third quarter of 1999. Another, Siemens, will not be able to
deploy solutions until the first quarter of the year 2000, and will have to
proceed in phases stretching into the following year. Nortel will have
part of its solution ready by the third quarter of 1998, but the second
phase will have to wait until the second quarter of the year 2000. The
only company that will promise on the public record to have a solution
ready by the third quarter of 1998 is Bell Emergis, and that solution
appears to be speculative at best.
(3) CALEA's public accountability mechanisms have stymied FBI overreaching
Is CALEA working? It depends. From the point of view of both the phone
companies and the FBI, CALEA is not working. Compliance is snarled in
controversy. The capacity numbers the FBI was supposed to issue in October
1995 still are not final. The industry standards process to define
surveillance capabilities has been derailed by the FBI's heavy-handedness.
Yet in another sense, CALEA is working because the checks and balances in
the statute and its public accountability mechanisms have prevented the FBI
from imposing its will on the telephone industry.
Equally noteworthy, the results produced by CALEA's complex procedural
structure can be contrasted with the situations in other Western
democracies. Canada does not have a CALEA-type statute. Instead, the
government simply paid Northern Telecom tens of million dollars to redesign
its switches to conform to what the national police force (the RCMP)
wanted. The UK also doesn't have a CALEA-type law, but its telephone
company adopted System X, which, according to a recent report for the
European Parliament, has the built-in 'ability to take phones 'off hook'
and listen to the conversations occurring near the phone, without the user being aware.' (295K text and 210K images).
Then of course, there's Switzerland, where the Sonntags Zeitung newspaper
recently reported that Swiss police can track the whereabouts of mobile
phone users via a telephone company computer that records billions of
movements going back more than half a year.
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(5) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US
The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest
organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop
and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and
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End Policy Post 4.3.2 2/18/98
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